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Smart Cities can manifest as exclusive spaces through strategies of privatisation and 
commercialisation. This article investigates why the smart cities discourse has come to 
dominate the Indian urban policy landscape. While ‘smart cities’ is a ubiquitous term, it has 
mediated through local political and discursive contexts in different ways. In India, where the 
Smart Cities Mission was launched in June 2015, the reason for the dominance of the smart 
cities narrative in urban policy-making lies in the formation of an elite discourse coalition. The 
elite discourses originate in very different spheres but together they provide a simplified and 
coherent narrative of India’s urban transformation in order to establish a model of bypass 
urbanisation to avoid the ‘local political risks’ in the process of carving out exclusive urban 
spaces. By interrogating the dominance of the smart cities narrative as an elite discourse 
coalition the article contends with the received wisdom that it is just a natural outcome of 
neoliberal policy priorities and shows instead the precise and deliberate ways in which 
particular regimes of power and their biases and exclusions are justified and maintained.
INTRODUCTION
Why have Smart Cities emerged as the dominant discourse on urban development in India 
today? This article tackles this question by adopting a discourse coalition approach to explain 
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how a group of actors who originate in different spheres but share similar worldviews organise 
around a particular storyline on India’s urban transformation. This storyline in turn sets the 
direction for specific practices and institutional arrangements. While the ‘smart city’ concept 
is popular globally (Jong et al., 2015), it has mediated and has been reworked through local 
governance networks and contingent local practices and broader policy discourses. In India, 
the term ‘smart city’ has been in use since the early 2000s and it coincides with efforts to 
liberalise India’s urban development sector and the simultaneous emergence of powerful 
lobbies of information technology, management consulting firms and a new generation of 
professional middle classes. 
Although the term ‘smart city’ is used rather widely and loosely in India with different actors 
trying to serve different ends, at its core it is associated with initiatives for building new, 
privately built and governed cities on the outskirts of existing large cities or dotted along 
transport networks like the Delhi-Mumbai industrial corridor. In fact, when Narendra Modi 
launched the Smart Cities Mission (SCM) in 2015 it was primarily envisaged to build new 
greenfield sites with less bureaucratic hassle and more private sector investment with the aid 
of enabling regulations like the Special Economic Zones policy. Those ambitions have toned 
down somewhat because of parliamentary opposition to amendments to ease land acquisition 
policies. However, it is important to note and uncover the ubiquity of the smart cities concept 
as a manifestation of the coming together of long-standing aspirations of elite actors to redraw 
urban landscapes as pockets of ‘exclusive spaces’ (residential townships, business 
improvement districts, special economic zones, export processing zones). These “exclusive 
spaces” are organised and planned in exclusionary ways in order to allow one kind of  person- 
middle class resident, tourist or highly skilled professional (Low, 2016)- while deliberately 
reducing the number of undesirables.
4
No doubt, India’s neoliberal transformation since the 1990s has given momentum to this 
emphasis on extracting “the profitability of space’. It allows for the privatisation of urban land 
by enabling the ‘private interests’ of the economically powerful to undercut the ‘special 
interests’ of the poor, dispossessed peasants and workers” (Smith and Low, 2006, p.2). 
However, to stop at explaining the SCM as just a continuation of neoliberal hegemonyi  would 
imply investigating a single point source-  an elusive person or institution with a coherent set 
of ideas and practices (as if such a person/institution exists). It would result in glossing over 
the strategic actions, the conflicting interests and the manner in which different actors 
reproduce a given bias without necessarily sharing deep values or coordinating their actions in 
a specific socio-historical discursive and institutional context. Thus, if we look at the SCM as 
a coalition of elite discourses, which originate in different spheres but share similar worldviews 
and values, it can reveal important biases, norms, exclusionary logics that do not necessarily 
align with neoliberal ideals. 
Political problems, as we know, are socially constructed. How an issue such as ‘rapid 
urbanisation’ is to be dealt with, is determined by how the urban problem in India is represented 
in the first place. A particular social construction of urbanisation, for example, does not, exist 
out there but is formulated from available socio-historical discourses and reproduces and 
structures relations of dominance. From a dominant discourse, therefore, we can see how 
powerful actors coalesce around a particular urban narrative and impose their view of reality 
by manipulation, mobilisation of bias and the exercise of power. Discourse coalition approach 
fulfils this purpose by starting with the assumption that politics is a process in which different 
actors from different backgrounds form specific coalitions around specific storylines. 
Therefore rather than look for an elusive person or institution with a coherent set of ideas and 
practices we look for the particular context of practices (policy programmes, embedded 
routines, mutually understood rules and norms) in which a discourse coalition is formed. By 
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looking at the origins of three specific discourses from three different actors we will get a better 
sense of the making of the smart city discourse coalition. The three discourses are: Narendra 
Modi government’s technocratic nationalism, IT sector’s technological utopia and MC 
activists’ world class city. Each discourse originates in very different spheres but share 
discursive affinities, which coalesce into a discourse coalition in the specific policy context of 
creating smart cities.
Investigating these individual discourses and the process by which they come together to 
dominate a political realm will provide a more in-depth understanding of the indirect, ideational 
and institutional dimensions of power in the SCM. While an important enabling component of 
the SCM is the application of digital technology, it is also very much about reproducing a 
governance regime that keeps intact particular interests and specific relations of power and 
dominance. Urban development in India has emerged as an elite driven project. The discourse 
coalition of SCM therefore draws on the ideological synergies, values and worldviews of 
middle class, private sector and government lobbies to produce a simplified and coherent 
narrative on urbanisation. It attempts to keep intact a governance regime that can produce 
‘exclusive spaces’ without the ‘hassle’ of local political contestation. In light of this, the 
following sections show how the technocratic nationalism of the Narendra Modi government 
provides the political argument for expert-led rule; how the technological utopia of the IT 
sector provides an economic argument for ‘exclusive’ smart cities for the highly skilled; and 
the rule by aesthetics discourse urban middle class activists provides an aesthetic rationality 
for delineating spaces for the affluent.
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ELITE DISCOURSES COALITIONS AND EXCLUSIVE SPACES
In his seminal work The Mind and Society Vilfredo Pareto (1916) denoted ‘elites’ as those 
individuals who most excel in all walks of life and/or possess much power and wealth. Political 
elites consist of persons who are able, by virtue of strategic positions in powerful organisations 
and movements, to affect political outcomes, usually at the level of national states, regularly 
and substantially (Higley and Pakulski, 2012, p. 2). With neoliberal reforms it is widely held 
that the power has shifted to financial and corporate elites with global reach. However, 
corporate partnership with states as well as support of domestic social elites remain crucial to 
advancing urban policy interventions.
Theorists of the modern state have conceived of the coalition of elites as a small and narrow 
circle, of ‘ruling minorities’ consisting of major political parties and top executive positions 
(Weber, 1978) and the ‘top clique’ whose members share ideas, sentiments and policies and 
are therefore capable of agreed and continuing actions (Mosca, 1939). In democratic states, 
where there are institutional and regulatory checks on the exercise of power, the cohesion 
between elites cannot entirely be explained as a tightly knit group of a few hundreds, that 
circulates between important sectors (military, business, politics) to maintain their authority 
over the rest (Higley and Pakulski, 2012, p. 2). The influence of various elites over policy-
making and political outcomes is made possible in democratic societies much more with 
persuasion than coercion (although the possibility of violence is implied and always there). In 
other words, cohesion of elites and their combined influence over policy-making is enabled 
through dominant discourses - which are simplified versions of elements of different elite 
discourses. Furthermore successful elite management of non elite conflicts “requires 
substantial elite insulation from non elite pressures” while also containing non elite conflicts 
“through bonds of loyalties, shared identities, common commitments and convergent interests 
between elites and non elites” (Higley and Pakulski, 2012, p. 8). The SCM as a dominant 
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discourse in urban policy in India today I argue is an instance of an elite discourse coalition 
that reveals shared ideas in the name of common good but equally seeks to insulate itself from 
local political contestation through special regulatory powers and institutional mechanisms.
For this article, by ‘elite discourse’ I am referring in particular to the text and talk of politicians, 
government officials, corporate managers, Information technology(IT) consultants, 
management consultants and urban middle class representations of resident welfare 
associations. Elite discourse is one of the important means that establishes, enacts, maintains, 
expresses and legitimates dominance (van Dijk 1993, p,17). One of the main sources of power 
of elites is their privileged access to various forms of public discourse through their control 
over channels of communication including mass media, research and scholarship, politics, 
business organisations among many other domains and organisations of society (van Dijk 1993, 
p.10). Therefore by looking carefully at the influential text and talk of elites from policy 
documents, everyday conversations such as interviews, speeches given by political leaders, 
research reports from IT corporations and consulting firms, televised debates and newspaper 
reports we can grasp how consent and legitimation for dominant interests is manufactured. 
The SCM is a particular instance of the coming together and institutionalisation of three elite 
discourses- Narendra Modi’s technocratic nationalism, the IT sector’s urban technological 
utopia and the urban middle class activism for aesthetic rationality of rule. Each of these 
discourses circulates in different spheres from formal policy documents, to consulting reports, 
to manifestos and public interest litigations submitted by resident’s welfare associations. These 
discourses share similar interests and visions for idealised urban environments that reflect the 
aspirations of affluent and aspiring classes for prosperous, clean and green lifestyles and for 
creating these environments with speed and minimum ‘bureaucratic’ hassle. These urban 
visions do carry exclusionary logics of development but these logics are concealed or 
euphemised by describing poverty for instance as a ‘nuisance’, as a problematic attitude of 
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dependency or just misplaced largesse on the part of  social and political institutions. The extent 
of the ‘exclusionary logic’ varies depending on where the discourse originates. For example, 
IT consulting firms recommend that the urban economic model should prioritise ‘highly skilled 
talented professionals’ over ‘mass labour’, whilst middle class everyday conversations describe 
poverty as a nuisance, as unaesthetic and something to be kept outside their inner realms. 
Formal policy documents on smart cities, however, have started using a more ‘inclusive’ 
rhetoric due to political contestation over issues such as land acquisition and the rights of the 
urban poor (Hoelscher, 2016, p.13). While the term ‘poor’ appears in policy documents, the 
aspirations of the ‘poor’ are recognised as the same as that of middle classes.
In the SCM the differences and complexities between the three elite discourse get ironed out 
or concealed in one simplified storyline on India’s urban revolution and the norm of conducting 
urban development initiatives without the ‘political hassle’. The SCM gives more rigour to a 
long-standing approach of ‘bypass urbanisation’ practiced by urban elite, private companies 
and real estate developers, where in the absence of local political support projects bypass 
‘normal’ political processes and still go ahead. 
Therefore, 19 of first 20 cities selected for the SCM in 2016 will be delivered through Special 
Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) including: Bhubaneshwar in Orissa, Vadodara in Gujarat, Bhagalpur 
in Bihar, Jabalpur, Bhopal and Indore in Madhya Pradesh and Jaipur and Udaipur in Rajasthan. 
Andhra Pradesh’s proposed new capital Amravati, which was not selected for Smart Cities’ 
funding, will go ahead with support of foreign governments and international technology 
companies. 
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POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE SMART CITIES MISSION
One of the promises that Narendra Modi made in his 2014 election campaign was to create100-
smart cities in India by 2022. True to his election manifesto, in June 2015 the SCM was 
launched with a budget of $15billion. The SCM was presented as something of an urban 
revolution aimed at addressing India’s rapid urbanisation, which is set to increase from 31.2% 
in 2011 to 40% in 2031 (Rav et al., 2016).  The SCM was greeted with much enthusiasm and 
publicity despite the fact that in 2015 India’s urban population (33%), much like the size of its 
supposedly bulging middle classii is not comparable with other emerging economies like China 
(56%) and Brazil (86%) (World Bank, 2015).
Narendra Modi’s SCM continues from the legacy of neoliberal urban planning, which was 
given an impetus by the previous Congress Government. In 2005, the JNNURM (Jawaharlal 
Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission) was launched in order to regenerate India’s cities. 
JNNURM lays special emphasis on decentralising urban local bodies, making city-level 
institutions more financially bankable and investing in large urban infrastructure projects, 
especially transport. Although JNNURM (2005-2014) was criticised for funding delays and  
for failing to devolve power to urban local bodies (Weinstein et al., 2014) it succeeded in 
changing legal systems and processes in order to “remove the constraints from using land as a 
resource” (Jaipal Reddy, Minister of Urban Development, 2009). These reforms included the 
amendment to the Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants Act, 1971 in 2010 to enable eviction 
without delay from “public premises” like metro rail projects; and the call to repeal of the 
Urban Land Ceiling Act from all 29 states and Union Territories by 2010.  Furthermore, 
institutional changes such as the bifurcation of the Ministry of Urban Development and Poverty 
Alleviation in 2005 to two separate ministries – Ministry of Urban Development and Ministry 
of Housing and Poverty reflected the shift towards more market led urban development.
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In 2015, the SCM was launched as a competition, where the Urban Development Ministry first 
came up with a list of 100 cities. Subsequently, municipal offices submitted bids to procure 
central government funding of $75 million each to carry out selected urban redevelopment 
projects by 2022. Of the 97 cities most of them are located on major urban-industrial corridors 
(Pune, Kakinada, Kochi, Belgaum, Solapur, Hubbali-Dharwad), or have the potential of 
developing as satellite towns for major cities (Davanageree, Bidhannagar, Belagavi), 24 are 
capital cities (Guwahati, New Delhi, Chennai), 24 are business and industrial centres, 18 are 
culture and tourism influenced areas (Ujjain, Tirupati, Varanasi), 5 are port cities (Kochi, Surat, 
Vishakapatnam) and 3 are education and health care hubs. Furthermore, 71% of the funding 
for first 20 cities that were selected will be spent on area-based development (including 
redevelopment of old cities and creation of new central business districts, retrofitting 
infrastructure such as water supply, sewerage and creation of public spaces), which are 
expected to benefit only 4% of the city’s population on average (Joshi, 2016). A further 40 
cities and 38 cities were added within the next 2 years (2016-2018).
Operationally, the SCM departs from previous urban development programmes in two 
important respects: i) instead of developing neglected urban areas or enhancing urban services 
to match supply with growing demand the SCM takes an area-based approach to upgrading 
cities. This could include greenfield projects which are entirely new satellite townships to 
existing cities, retrofitting new infrastructure in an existing area or re-developing built-up 
areas; ii) in contradiction with the 74th  constitutional amendment, which was aimed at 
devolving more power and autonomy to municipal governments, the SCM invests in Special 
Purpose Vehicles which can bypass urban local bodies to implement the mission.
Although the SPV is supposed to be just a more efficient implementing body than a government 
entity, its main purpose is to act as a revenue stream with decision-making powers taken away 
from the heads of municipal and state governments and given to the CEO of the SPV. It is 
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important to note here, that the Central Government’s total allocations of $15billion over 5 
years for 100 cities (of which $7.5 billion is for Smart Cities and $7.5 for AMRUT which is a 
low cost housing initiative) (Jaitley, 2014) is less than the total budget of  the JNNURM which 
was $20billion for 67 cities for 7 years between March 2007-March 2014 (MUD Annual Report 
2005,p1-2). In the SCM municipal managers and state government leaders have to find most 
of the funding for urban projects from private investors. The Smart Cities’ SPV, which is set 
up as a limited company under Companies Act, 2013 would have the central government 
funding (from the SCM) kept in a separate grant fund, which in turn would have to be matched 
by the state government and urban local body through a range of revenue generating 
instruments including private investment, infrastructure debt funds, real estate investment 
trusts, municipal bonds, loans, joint ventures, taxes and surcharges (MOUD, 2015, p.14). The 
SPV would be a much more credit worthy and politically-risk free body to bring private 
investments to. Thus, one of the conditions of the SPV is that state government and urban local 
bodies should be equal equity shareholders who can invite private investors to have a stake in 
the equity.
The SPV therefore as a model of interactive governance is the precise set of practices where 
an elite discourse coalition is sealed together to institutionalise a particular model of urban 
development, which sees urban land and the uses to which it is put chiefly through a monetised 
lens. If the Central Government through institutionalising this discourse paves the way for a 
more centralised model of urban governance that encourages private partnership but dispels 
local devolution of power, then the IT sector through their focus on urban digital innovation 
see cities as knowledge economies of the highly skilled and “returns urban planning to 
standardised modernist traditions” (Joss, 2016, p.2). Meanwhile the urban upper middle 
classes, who have been the chief beneficiaries of the neoliberal economic model, can tune in 
their aesthetic desire for “slum free” and “poverty free” world-class public spaces with the 
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other two discourses. The smart cities discourse coalition therefore is not just an extension of 
neoliberal hegemony it is the coming together of elite discourses within the specific and 
favourable context of a policy programme, which is deliberately placed outside of local 
representative politics. 
We will now look at each of the three discourses that make up the Smart Cities discourse 
coalition.
MODI’S TECHNOCRATIC NATIONALISM
Narendra Modi’s national urban mission continues from already-existing market led urban 
development policies while also bringing his own legacy from Gujarat which under his 
leadership (2001-2014) emerged as India’s most urbanised state (in the 2011 census Gujarat’s 
urban population was 42.5% whereas the national average was 31.16%) (Government of 
Gujarat, 2011, p.5). Modi’s philosophy of “rurbanisation” stressed urban development over 
rural investment, with emphasis on setting up “world-class” townships on rural land quickly 
and without bureaucratic hassle. 
Modi’s political discourse can be termed as “technocratic nationalism”. It is “technocratic” 
because of the belief in technology-based solutions for social problems as well as the faith in 
the “rule of experts” (consultants, corporate managers, bureaucrats). This includes Modi 
himself who is presented as a CEO-like figure - more a manager who believes in outcomes 
rather than a politician. It is “nationalist” because of the discourse of pride and community that 
it is imbued with. Much of Narendra Modi’s overwhelming popularity can be attributed to a 
successful strategy of combining nationalist discourse with neoliberal development 
imperatives. Nitasha Kaul (2017) argues for instance that the populist appeal of Modi led BJP 
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government in contemporary India lies in large part to a successful strategy of political myth-
making wherein both Hindu nationalism and development  - one seen as cultural and 
reactionary and the other as economic and apolitical can successfully work together. Smart 
cities for example aim at harnessing urban economic potential but also appeal to majoritarian 
desires for more control over public space through circulating tropes of global status, 
religiosity, heritage and affluent lifestyles.  
Accordingly, Modi’s urban mission is directed to what he calls as the “neo middle class”, along 
with his usual upper middle class support base. He had first used the term in 2012 Gujarat 
Assembly election manifesto to refer to urban voters who had just moved out of poverty but 
were not yet firmly positioned in the luxuries of “middle class life”. Modi’s “neo-middle class” 
comprises of a range of low-skilled urban workers from tea vendors, to mechanics and cable 
T.V. operators. It’s the lower end of the middle class that has seen the greatest expansion in the 
decade between 2001 and 2011 as the number of low income households (earning just over £2 
per day) has increased from 63% in 2001 to 77% in 2011 (Kochchar, 2015).  Whereas the 
middle income households (earning more than $10 a day) have marginally increased from 1% 
in 2001 to 11% in 2011 (Kochchar, 2015). 
In policy documents like the Union Budget (Jaitley, 2014) and the SCM (MOUD, 2015) the 
term “middle class” appears more often than traditional policy subjects like “poor” and 
“common man”. The use of the term “middle class” marks an important rhetorical shift as 
policies are directed to “established” and “aspirational” groups who show a fatigue with the 
political establishment’s preoccupation with “the curse of poverty” (Jaitley, 2014), “aspire” for 
a house and more wealth, and rather than depending on state largesse want more speed and 
efficiency in building affluent “world-class” cities. 
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Narendra Modi, is a populist leader who relates directly to “aspirant” people and promises to 
circumvent all intermediaries and neutralizing institutions to realise their interests (Jaffrelot, 
2013). Take for example the 2015 Annual Report from the Ministry of Urban Development. It 
opens with a statement by Narendra Modi himself that “AMRUT, SCM and Housing for All 
mark a watershed moment in our quest to create better and futuristic cities. These initiatives 
mark a paradigm shift, providing a people-centric approach to create world-class urban 
spaces.” In Modi’s political discourse “people-centric” means that people power is stronger 
and more important than institutions. He has for instance, described the SCM as a “people’s 
movement” and not just a system of allocating money for various projects. In a speech at a 
conference in Pune in June 2016 he states that, “It is not that earlier no work was done in our 
country, nor was it that governments did not spend budgets. Those of us who are in 
government…have to know that if there is anyone smarter than us then it is the citizen of this 
country” (Modi, 2016). More emphatically, he adds that, “if the strength of crores of citizens 
is consolidated then we will not need government and the country will progress rapidly on its 
own” (Modi., 2016)
In this high tech populism, Narendra Modi prevails over the urban policy initiative to the extent 
that in order to achieve outcomes quickly and efficiently he deals directly with professionals, 
bureaucrats and investors than the ministers of the relevant government departments (Jaffrelot, 
2013). Take for example, Modi’s speech in June 2013, where he unequivocally promotes 
technocrats over politicians, “In urban activity the majority of the work is technical – roads, 
power – but manpower in cities is clerical – almost 95%. Clerks are bookkeeping but they 
cannot develop the city. So the manpower should give more strength to the technocrats.” 
Furthermore, the urban development ministers Venkaiah Naidu (2016) added that, “urban 
leaders must take the help of consultants, experts to formulate the smart city plan so that cities 
can be more attractive to investors and be outward-facing.” 
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This reliance on experts over elected representatives is consistent with middle class preference 
for technocratic rule, as shown in recent surveys. When asked whether “all major decisions 
about the country should be taken by experts rather than politicians, more middle classes have 
said “yes” than any other groups. From the World Values Survey of 2012 and 2014 it appears 
that between three forms of governance –democracy, army rule and rule by experts, the upper 
and lower middle classes prefer rule by experts and strong leaders to democracy (Basu and 
Capelos, 2016). The extent of support for expert rule and strong leaders on a scale of 1 to 10, 
in 2006 was 6.20 for upper middle classes and 6.17 lower middle class, and this grew in 2014 
to 7.21 for upper middle class and 7.00 for lower middle class (Basu and Capelos, 2016). With 
Narendra Modi at the helm, middle classes are assured that he will valorise a more managerial 
decision-making process over parliamentary democracy. 
This preference for technocratic rule is imbued with a nationalist discourse, which is not quite 
the hard-core anti-Muslim and religious chest-beating of the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh 
(RSS) but is infused with sentiments of pride and ambition for India to be recognised as a 
global power and an economically prosperous nation. For instance, one of the principles that 
Modi emphasises on is the speed of execution of projects and thus he urges “the world thinks 
that India takes ages to complete projects. Can’t we change this impression?” (Modi, 2013). 
On another occasion he says, “Why have so many countries in the world who got independence 
after us and who were more in debt than us have moved ahead of us?” (Modi, 2016). This 
preoccupation with India’s global image would indeed have an appeal amongst the globally 
mobile middle classes and this sentiment of seeing quick changes is reflected in the setting of 
projects as short-term targets rather than long-term integrated development programmes. The 
SCM is set with a target date of 2022 – the 85th anniversary of India’s independence, while the 
Swachch Bharat (clean India) campaign is set with a target date of 2027 –  the 158th birth 
anniversary of Mohandas Gandhi.
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Overall, technocratic nationalism fundamentally shifts the way in which the problem of poverty 
is defined. Poverty in this discourse, is not so much a problem of access or exclusion but rather 
the state’s failure to recognise the material aspirations of the poor and to see how similar their 
aspirations are to that of the middle classes. Narendra Modi (2013) suggests that there are “two 
cities within a city - one is a city of those who serve and one is a city of those who receive 
services. He explains elsewhere “so far in Hindustan the government’s attitude was that people 
will be happy as long as the government gives them something. But this is injustice to those 
self-reliant people. They are searching for an opportunity to do something to make a 
difference.” The “opportunity” he is referring to is the city – “the city is a financial growth 
centre, and I believe that the strongest solution to poverty is the city” (Modi, 2016). He 
generalises that the “mindset” of all people is “that to move ahead you have to have a footstep 
in the city”. Accordingly, urban development programmes are presented as one step towards 
fulfilling aspirations. For example in the context of the housing project he says, “any person, 
even the poorest of the poor has a dream of owning a home and once they have their own home 
he starts building more dreams…once the poor man gets a house slowly his aspirations also 
change. He will think that it would be good to buy a carpet. Then he will want to buy two 
chairs. Then he will want to buy a T.V. Then he thinks that to do all of this I will work harder, 
I will save money. And this is how self-motivation comes in” (Modi, 2016).
This approach of seeing poverty not as a problem but rather as aspirations for more material 
wealth connects with middle class values around consumerism and affluent lifestyle. And 
clearly when Narendra Modi talks about the “poor” in the context of Smart Cities he is referring 
not to the urban poor as such but to the new middle classes –  i.e. those urban households who 
have just come out of poverty. This emphasis on aspiration and self-motivation is legitimised 
further through the emphasis on competition as the main driving force. He says, “previously 
competition was for who is more poor and backward, but this government is opening up 
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competition to move forward” (Modi, 2013). In other words, competition is not relying on state 
largesse but is about accepting competition as a fundamental ethos of market-driven society. 
He extends this principle of competition to municipal managers as well stating that “You 
become mayors through competition. To get a job you have to compete. Even for development 
of cities competition is necessary” (Modi, 2013). City managers are encouraged to identify a 
brand identity for their city – a unique selling point, which will be attractive to investors, 
tourists and young people (MOUD, 2015).
Thus, as we have seen above the smart cities campaign as envisioned by Narendra Modi’s 
government is mobilised through a version of technocratic nationalism, which combines faith 
in the rule of experts and strong leadership to bring about faster and more decisive urban 
regeneration with the spirit of enhancing India’s global image. But how does this connect with 
the discourse of the IT consulting firms sector and the middle classes? We will explore this in 
the forthcoming sections. 
IT CONSULTING FIRMS’ TECHNOLOGICAL UTOPIA
IT consulting firms (ITCF) frame smart cities as a technological utopia by bringing together 
two long standing tropes of urban planning:  1) systems thinking which conceives the city as a 
network of integrated systems where data, digital technology and people flow seamlessly; and 
2) a utopian discourse that exposes urban pathologies and their cure (Soderstrom, Paasche and 
Klauser, 2014 p. 14). ICT facilities are presented as the key medium through which companies 
can collaborate and innovate to provide better services to citizens, improve infrastructure over 
less time and with limited resources, enhance economic efficiency and deliver on governance 
reform through more accountability and feedback mechanisms from citizens. ITCF present 
smart cities as a blueprint that can be applied widely across urban territories. However, it is 
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important to note that the application of the smart cities concept is “selectively adopted and 
reworked as it becomes embedded in local governance networks and pre-existing strategic 
concerns” (Cowley, Joss and Dayot, 2017, p.3). While the global discourse on smart cities has 
been described as a form of “corporate storytelling”  where IT sector presents itself as an 
obligatory passage point for transformation cities into smart ones (Soderstrom, Paasche and 
Klauser, 2014), or as a return to standardised modernist and rational urban planning traditions 
(Joss, 2016), there are specific nuances to be found in the Indian context. For instance, 
discourse analysis of the reports of ITCF on Smart Cities in India and interviews and articles 
from leaders of these firms shows at least three interlocking discourse frames: 1) a spatial  
element of  new urban territories as “greenfield” sites; 2) a social element of middle classes as 
the ideal citizens in whose name these projects are devised and rationalised 3) and finally a 
political component of private-public partnership.
Tracing the origins of the smart cities agenda in India, Hoelscher (2016) explains that it 
coincides with the economic liberalisation of urban development as evidenced in Mckinsey’s 
influential Urban Awakening report (2010) which presses for market led approach to urban 
planning. The report suggests important changes to national urban policy priorities including: 
selecting urban development over rural development, taking the aspirations of the expanding 
middle class and tech-savvy youth more seriously and adopting a more techno managerial and 
corporate-led approach to governance.  
The precursor to the Indian smart city were urban e governance initiative of urban local bodies 
(ULBs) in the early to mid 2000s. The terms “smart city” first appears in print media from 
around 2004 and refers primarily to public private partnership for massive infrastructure 
projects like the Delhi Mumbai Industrial Corridor (DMIC) and residential townships of the 
urban elite (from my content analysis of print media reports from 2005-2015)iii. Through this 
period it is evident that while the concept of the smart city is coloured with terms such as 
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“gadgets and robots galore”, “intelligent communication tools”, “legacy systems” and “data 
analytics”, the core issue is that of land acquisition and the “chaos” of delivering ambitious 
projects in India’s political system. 
India’s Smart Cities follows on from the policy trajectory of Special Economic Zones– a 
controversial legislation, which was introduced in 2005 to enhance foreign investment by 
providing a single window clearance for land acquisition, exemptions from environmental 
compliance, labour laws etc. The 7  new cities planned on the Delhi Mumbai Industrial Corridor 
as well as Dholera and GIFT City in Gujarat were introduced through the SEZ Act and Special 
Investment Regions Act (SIR) as “globally connected financial and technological hubs of the 
new Indian elite” (Hoelscher, 2016, p, 33). When Narendra Modi initially announced that 100 
Smart Cities would be creates by 2020 he had envisaged them as greenfield sites. Concurrently, 
with the Smart Cities policy he sought to remove requirement of landowners consent and social 
impact assessment on land acquired for developmental purposes as per the Right to Fair 
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement 
(LARR) Act, 2013. He, however, has been unable to pass this ordinance through both houses 
of parliament in India, and subsequently more recent Smart Cities documents show a rhetorical 
shift that adds “inclusive” projects within exiting cities to the earlier vision of exclusive new 
cities.
The ITCF reports on smart cities in India are embedded within this policy trajectory, which 
prioritises smart cities as “exclusive spaces” for the new urban elite to be brought about through 
“enabling regulations” such as SEZ, Special Industrial Region (SIR) and the Special Township 
Policy, 2016. This framing of smart cities as “exclusive spaces” ties in with the aspirations of 
India’s new urban middle classes for “world-class” gated cities that are modelled on the cities 
in the richest nations rather than their own local contexts (Fueller and Narasimhan, 2007).  
Thus, there are three interlocking discursive frames in the ITCF reports: rationalisation of 
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smart cities as greenfield sites, idealisation of urban upper middle class and legitimisation of 
private-public urban governance model. 
 Predominantly, ITCF reports conceive of smart cities as a blueprint model that can be easily 
replicated and connected. For instance, Cisco’s Anil Menon (2017) urges “smart civic leaders 
to benchmark their cities against the very best cities globally” and presents Cisco Smart City 
in Bangalore as a model for other Indian cities to follow (Cisco, 2014). Amitabh Kant, Director 
of the Delhi Mumbai Industrial Corridor projects, adds that if cities do not benchmark against 
the very best they risk losing people as they will move away to the new centres (Kant, 2012). 
These ‘state of the art residential zones’ or ‘greenfield townships’, however cannot realistically 
be achieved fully in India’s fast urbanising cities where development has taken place largely 
in breach of formal planning calculations. Although the informalisation of formal planning, has 
benefitted middle classes, rich property developers and businesses as much as it has selectively 
tolerated the informal settlements of the urban poor. 
The preference for greenfield townships in ITCF reports, continues from the policy legacy of 
decongesting the inner core of India’s large cities through acts such as Rent Control Act and 
Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act, 1976. However, contrary to the socialist principles on 
which these Acts were based ICTF conceive smart cities as exclusive spaces. A NASSCOM 
report (2015) suggests that “large parts of cities today completely escape  mainstream planning 
and that illegal development (unauthorised constructions, slums)… threaten the future of urban 
areas…”. Instead of the present planning focus on the core area of the city periurban and rural 
areas should be integrated into the regional framework the NASSCOM, 2015 report goes on to 
suggest. 
These greenfield cities, however, are envisaged as business districts with all the residential 
and infrastructure facilities that would encourage highly skilled workers or urban middle 
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classes to migrate to. Anj Aradhya (2016), Director and Head of Enterprise Management 
Services writes “that while improving citizens services can be taken up for the existing cities, 
it (planning) should focus on building new cities as greenfield cities for real urbanisation”. New 
cities are exclusive cities and Laveesh Bhandari (2015) the chief economist at Indicus Analytics 
stated that price and police could be used to keep the undesirables out: 
“When we build these smart cities we will be faced with a massive surge of people who will 
desire to enter these cities. We will be forced to keep them out. This is the natural way of things, 
for if we do not keep them out they will override our ability to maintain such infrastructure. 
There are only two ways of keeping people out of any space – prices and policing. … the prices 
will be automatically higher in such cities. Even with high prices, the conventional laws in 
India will not enable us to exclude millions of poor India… Hence the police will need to 
physically exclude people from such cities…”
The SCM policy thus sets out to build “compact areas” (not integrated areas) that can be a 
“replicable model” (not a locally led solution) for “other aspiring cities” (MUD Annual Report, 
2015). New towns like Rohini, Dwarka, Narela in Delhi, Navi Mumbai to Mumbai, Salt Lake 
City to Kolkata, Yelahanka and Kengeri to Bangalore, Private Cities like Hiranandani and 
Lavasa in Mumbai and Smart Cities on the DMIC, Naya Raipur in Chhatisgarh and Sricity in 
Andhra Pradesh are preferred as one report suggests because “it is logical and quicker to build 
entire new cities from scratch “rather than rehabilitating infrastructure of existing cities” 
because of “the mess that Indian cities are in” (Agentschap, 2011). A Deloitte report (2015) 
suggests that while “developing a new or greenfield smart city with target population of 
500,000 to 1 million is likely to require financial investment ranging between INR 75,000 and 
150,000 (p.11) a large part of the investments may be recovered through sale of land and/or 
commercial and residential real estate”. Abhishek Lodha, Managing Director of Lodha Group 
which developed Pavlava a private city on the outskirts of Mumbai answers in an interview 
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with Mckinsey states that, “new satellite cities are preferred to improving existing ones as “old 
cities have limited potential to rewrite the rules. They cannot significantly change people’s 
living and working experience, whereas new cities can generate new economic activities.” 
Amitabh Kant (2012) stresses that “India needs to create 500 new cities by the time it become 
75 in the year 2022, otherwise every single existing Indian city will become a living slum.”
These new developments are implemented through policies like the Special Township Policy 
(Government of Maharashtra, 2016), where the government mainly facilitates land purchase 
and access to public infrastructure like roads and airports. The rationale of state level and 
central governments for such exclusive spaces is that “knowledge based industries require high 
end commercial and residential built environment along with high quality infrastructure. Since 
these sectors are manned by the young, availability of good quality health services, educational 
institutions and modern entertainment facilities will drive such development” (Government of 
Maharashtra, 2016).
Knowledge economies have been promoted widely by ITCF and the Indian government has 
merged this within the SCM. Importantly, this emphasis on the knowledge economy” coincides 
with the priority given to urban middle classes i.e. the generation of professionals that have 
emerged since neoliberal changes of the 1990s as the ideal policy subject of the SCM. IBM for 
instance advocates the economic model of ‘cognitive cultural capitalism’ which is inspired by 
the richest countries in the world. This ‘new ‘knowledge economy’ is made up of sectors such 
as high technology industry, business and financial services, personal services and the media 
and involves digital technology combined with new forms of production, new labour skills and 
new social structures. A.J. Scott explains (2014) that a knowledge economy involves the top 
half of the labour force and IBM proposes that rather than “the bricks and mortar drivers of 
economic growth” smart civic leaders should concentrate on economy based on “brains and 
creativity” (Dirks, Gurdgiev and Keeling, 2010). 
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A Cisco report  (2014) defines urban middle classes as “economic performers who are seeking 
to take advantage of technologies to further their personal and collective opportunities. The 
competitive advantage of a city’s economy depends on its capacity to absorb the “talent pool” 
of highly skilled workers rather than on traditional drivers such as natural resources, physical 
labour or manufacturing prowess. Smart civic leaders, an IBM report advises, should “shift 
their investment strategies from attracting and supporting mass  labour pools to creating system 
of services designed to optimise the city around highly skilled, innovative citizens and 
communities as well as knowledge-intensive businesses” (Dirks, Gurdgiev and Keeling, 2010, 
p.1). 
A report from Deloitte (2015) defines changes brought about by knowledge economies as a 
disruption to labour markets caused by ‘disruptive technology’ – a technological innovation 
that creates new markets and value chains while displacing old ones. While the report 
recommends that automation would make some jobs redundant it also suggests that city’s 
economic sustainability depends very much on its ability to attract highly skilled professionals 
in a competitive global market.
Thus, smart civic leaders are advised to prepare for a “war on talent” to ensure sustainable 
economic growth (Deloitte, 2015). Accordingly, the SCM suggests that civic leaders have to 
create the most attractive living condition to “lure the internationally mobile highly skilled 
labour force” (MOUD, 2014). 
Finally, while digital technological innovation is a key enabling component of ITCF’s 
discourse on smart cities, it also very much about governance reform. Particularly, in the Indian 
context this covers amongst other things the framework for public private partnership with 
more centralisation of authority, raising new revenue channels while also delivering more with 
less resources and conceiving a citizenship regime where access to digital technology is key 
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and where citizens are consumers who exercise accountability by providing feedback for urban 
services. Overall, the thrust of governance reform is to make private sector involvement in 
urban transformation projects less exposed to the complexities of representative government 
institutions and laws. 
A World Economic Forum report written with Price Waterhouse Coopers (2016) sets the main 
principle of governance reform as: “create an environment where a balance is achieved between 
the private sector’s goal to access maximum returns and the public sector’s goal to achieve 
social welfare at minimum cost.”  In line with the SCM’s model of delivering projects through 
SPVs the reports suggest installing “a unified command structure across multiple planning and 
administrative entities” (NASSCOM, 2015, p. 3-4), “ULB’s making data-driven decisions”, 
and a “single window system that ease the permitting process”, “power and autonomy for the 
mayor”. 
In one report (NASSCOM, 2015) “local community opposition”, “environment and other 
permits” are listed as risks, which can be mitigated with a more autonomous command structure 
like SPVs. Furthermore there is emphasis on expert rule, with statements like “cities in India 
are governed by generalists. A framework for urban specialists does not exist… which leads to 
“management by authority” rather than “management through knowledge”. Citizen 
engagement is mainly conceived as inclusion by reducing the digital divide and encouraging 
participation and accountability through use digital devices. To sum up, while digital 
technology might appear as the key component for governance reform the principles in fact 
underscore more centralised authority and autonomy over decision-making, clearly maintains 
that social welfare remains the public sector’s prerogative and finally conceives of citizens as 
digital consumers.
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MIDDLE CLASSES’ RULE BY AESTHETICS
We have seen so far in the discourse of Modi’s technocratic nationalism and the technological 
utopia of ITCF’s that the “construction of an idealised urban environment” in the form of smart 
cities is as much about creating an idealised middle class citizenry as it is about meeting the 
demands of an already existing middle class (Ghertner, 2012, p. 1161).  Take for example the 
excerpt from a speech by the Finance Minister Arun Jaitley:
“As the fruits of development reach an increasingly large number of people…. A neo middle 
class is emerging which has the aspiration of better living standards…. This would mean that 
it will have to provide a very high quality of life comparable with any developed European 
city.” (Jaitley quoted in Government of India, 2014, p.2)
Local states like Maharashtra, Karnataka, Gujarat, Punjab, Andhra Pradesh take an increasingly 
active role in remaking the city for the middle classes. The Gujarat State Government describes 
GIFT city, Gujarat – arguably India’s first Smart City, as follows:
“We are not building this city for the ordinary Indian. We have to promote facilities which 
people are affiliated to. Since our competition is with Dubai, Singapore and so on we have to 
give them the comfort of doing business in the same environment.” (quoted in Datta, 2015, 
p.83)
Middle classness is a social and ideological construction that incorporates notions of 
consumerism, aspirations for ‘world-class city-zenship’ (Kamath, 2007) and urban 
beautification campaigns for cleaner, greener and more open spaces. However, this ideological 
construct is at odds with the empirical reality of middle classes in India, which is highly 
differentiated, where largest expansion in the last two decades has taken place in the lower 
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middle class – earning just over $2 a day (Kochchar, 2015). So, if we look carefully at how 
“middle classness” produces an ideal urban citizenship it surfaces that it incorporates values of 
profit from real estate, use of digital technology as basis for equality of all, and an ‘aesthetic 
rationality for exclusion of slums and other undesirables (mass labour, urban poor). Take for 
example this excerpt from an interview with the CEO of Pavlava private city, Mumbai, who 
emphasises real estate profit as an incentive for citizen’s to maintain public spaces:
“Common spaces are not valued in India. This is because they are not well governed, or the 
legal framework makes it difficult for people to uphold their value. We see a difference in 
Pavlava, and this is probably explained by classical economy. Residents know that if their 
locality is well governed and looked after, the value of the property goes up. Two things can 
help to get people to value the commons. One is if they recognise a benefit or payoff, the other 
is the confidence that their efforts will not be sabotaged.” (Mckinsey, 2017)
Urban activism, since the 1990s in particular, has been the chief vehicle through which middle 
class has emerged as a collective political identity in India. Middle class claims to the city have 
amounted to a discourse of the ‘world-class city’ (Brosius, 2010), which defines urban spaces 
as exclusive integrated townships that offer the very highest of living standards, with amenities 
and lifestyles comparable to affluent cities in the developed world. The “world-class city” 
discourse emerged in India’s urban planning proposals from the late 1990s (Dupont, 2011) as 
part of efforts to turn megacities like Delhi into attractive centres for global capital investment. 
Around the same time, resident welfare association were provided with deliberating powers, 
through Delhi’s Bhagidari scheme for example, to have more direct responsibility over the 
upkeep of parks and public places in order to prevent the encroachment of public land by slums. 
Since the 1990s there has been a surge of public interest litigations submitted by RWAS, which 
have led to judicial orders for slum clearance simply because they look ‘unaesthetic’ and 
‘illegal’ (Ghertner, 2015, Datta, 2015). Mawdsley and Truelove, (2011) explain how earlier 
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slum clearance required rigorous, calculative practices by municipal authorities such as 
detailed enumeration and mapping whereas now all that the judiciary requires to issue a 
demolition order is evidence that a community looks unaesthetic – does not conform with the 
‘world’class’ image that the city government and wealthier residents wish to promote.
Middle class urban activism has produced a peculiar citizenship regime where real estate 
ownership and more short loop accountability (bypassing electoral politics) and aesthetic based 
claims to public spaces are central components. 
On real estate ownership as the basis for exclusive urban citizenship, Sanjay Kaul the head of 
People’s Action a confederation of Resident’s Welfare Associations in New Delhi suggests, 
“In Delhi those who legitimately own land, pay taxes and those with papers are getting pushed 
out of the city to satellite cities… the prices are going up so much from letting illegal 
occupation go on for political benefit  (quoted in Ghertner, 2012, p.1175).” Thus he establishes 
real estate prices as basis for citizenship claims over public space and exclusion of informal 
settlements of the urban poor.
This manufacturing of citizenship through real estate ownership is linked furthermore to claims 
to direct or short loop accountability for RWAs. The Urban Federation of Residents Welfare 
Associations(U-FERWA) in Hyderabad for example suggests, “Political intermediation in the 
urban local bodies has not proved very effective and successful. Decentralised self-government 
without self-management has not yielded the expected results in terms of development and 
quality of life… The area of colony resident welfare associations and apartment building 
resident welfare associations are emerging precisely as the most suitable mechanisms for self-
management” (U-FERWA, 2017). U-FERWA goes on to present middle class residents as the 
ideal citizens to carry this self-management initiative forward because: “they are educated, 
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qualified, experienced people who in general have some leisure, they are best people to self-
manage and self-govern their areas” (UFERWA, 2017).
Not surprisingly therefore, the populist tone of Narendra Modi’s Swachch Bharat (clean India) 
campaign and Smart Cities, where people power apparently overrides public institutions 
continues with the RWAs self management claims. The head of Vizag’s Confederation of 
RWA in an interview establishes this synergy “RWAs are very much required so that people 
can support the government and the government can support the people.”
This direct accountability between RWAS and central/state government, is in tune with middle 
class preference for bypass urbanisation, wherein as John Harris (2006) has shown - wealthier 
people in India tend to go directly to government or take legal action to solve their local 
problems and are less likely to go to political parties. These claims to bypassing urban local 
bodies for more direct action is based on the premise that middle classes are somehow 
politically alienated. In a television debate Sanjay Kaul the head of People’s Action, a 
conglomerate of RWAs in New Delhi was on a panel with a municipal leader and a local 
politician. While discussing master plan for Delhi the T.V. anchor says “throughout this 
discussion one gentleman was quiet. Then looking at S.K.  he asks “why were you quite?”
SK’s response is emblematic of a typical position that middle class urban activists take, “when 
such a discussion takes place the normal man does not get much room to negotiate.” The 
Television anchors asks, “why does the normal man always move back from such 
discussions?” And S.K. replies “unfortunately he does not think that politics has space for him”.
To sum up, middle class activism around urban spaces is based on an aesthetic rationality of 
rule - where desires for cleaner, safer and greener environment have been the basis for pressing 
legal intervention on slums clearance. The combined effect of direct powers to RWAs provided 
by urban/state governments and the circulating discourses on middle classes from private 
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companies is a distinctive version of urban citizenship. This citizenship regime takes real estate 
ownership, use of digital technology as an equalising force and direct accountability of RWAs 
as its founding principles. It forms the basis of a governance regime that aligns with 
government and ITCF to produce exclusive spaces through more centralised and exceptional 
powers.
Conclusion
With globalisation and the changes in the international political system, cities are at the locus 
of transnational flows of capital, labour and trade. The multiple and interlocking centres of 
power and influence in ‘global cities’ have led to the received notion that the best form of urban 
governance is an ‘interactive one’ involving non-hierarchical assemblages of state and non-
state actors rather than the traditional state-centred form of top-down and rule bound decision-
making. While this notion accounts for the multiple centres of power, influence and diverging 
interests in cities, it also somewhat erroneously assumes that the decline of a single legitimate 
centre of sovereign power somehow makes the operation of authority/governance more 
diffused and inclusive. The sources of authority might indeed be plural but to be effective it 
has to be structured around a relatively coherent architecture of institutions (Hirst and 
Thompson, 1996, pp.184-185). New regimes of governance are the result of deliberate and 
careful political practices that aim to preserve one set of interests over others. In this article, 
we have seen the SCM as a form of governance that manifests in the form of the SPV. Handing 
over power from municipal government to a separate corporate entity like the SPV, echoes the 
ideological belief that states and cities (i.e. its people and resources) are helpless to counter the 
elusive market forces that have produced “partitioned cities” with new forms of division that 
exclude a large number of people from participation in the mainstream economy (Marcuse, 
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2002). How does this specific version of neoliberal urban governance make the production of 
such “exclusive spaces” possible? This article answers this question by adopting a discourse 
coalition approach.
The definition of the problem of cities as one of maximising it economic potential in tune with 
the prevailing policy settlement of economic liberalisation requires the existence of a 
“discourse coalition” (Hajer, 1993). This discourse coalition, as we saw, is made up a group of 
actors who in the context of the SCM utter the same storyline- on what the nature of the urban 
problem is (neglect of economic potential) and how it should be treated (bypassing local 
governance to transform cities as attractive centres for tourists, investors and highly skilled 
professionals). This discourse coalition has an institutional base – in this case the SCM policy 
programme- which operates within a particular structure of power that frames the way in which 
a problem is constructed and guarantees that the coalition will be listened to (Atkinson, Held 
and Jeffares, 2010). 
However, in order to effectively position against competing forces the discourse coalition is 
forced to adopt language and narrative that partly contradicts their own values. For instance in 
the SCM there is inclusive rhetoric like ‘rurban’, ‘public use’, ‘citizen’s participation’, ‘holistic 
development’ from poverty and rights based approaches to urban development. However, in 
doing this the discourse coalition seeks to structure and limit debate, to prevent a problem from 
being though about in ways that question the narrative advocated by a particular discourse 
coalition. In the words of Atkinson, Held and Jeffares (2010) a discourse coalition therefore 
should not be thought of as ‘altrustic formations’ for a greater common good but actors that 
carefully and continuously develop and deploy strategies to achieve strategic goals.
We have looked at each discourse in this coalition individually in order to make complex this 
simplified storyline and expose its internal variation while also revealing how they are neatly 
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tied together within the architecture of urban interactive governance. If Narendra Modi’s 
technocratic nationalism provides the political basis for centralised and expert-driven 
governance in the name of the new middle class, then the IT sector’s technotopia provides the 
economic rationale for an elite knowledge economy for the highly skilled and the middle class 
aesthetic rationality provides the basis for excluding undesirables and for carrying out 
initiatives away from local politics.
The differences between the discourses are evident mainly in the extent of bias and prejudice 
they level. If policy documents adopt a more inclusive rhetoric – as if the poor and middle class 
share similar interests- then IT sector advices that too much focus on poverty is misplaced and 
should be left to governments to sort out, while the middle class discourses present poverty as 
‘unsightly’ and therefore basis for slum clearance.
To conclude, the SCM will leave a legacy not just in expanding the role of digital technology 
in urban development project, but in institutionalising ideas that originate in elite discourses. 
These ideas have influence over how political and social institutions should be structured, how 
problems of exclusion and displacement should be addressed and how developmental priorities 
decide the uses to which public resources (land, money) should be put. Therefore, by critically 
examining the elite discourses that make up the discourse coalition on Smart Cities I have 
shown the biases and silences that are masked in the technical language of policy.
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